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Memories, methodologies, myths
I recognised the lump in my throat, that impotent and furious disgust: it was what I used to feel on catching sight of a member of the SS. French army uniforms today caused me to shudder just as I did at the sight of swastikas. I observed those young boys smiling in their camouflage uniform. . . Yes, I was living in a city under occupation, and I loathed the occupying forces with more distress than I did those of the 1940s [because of all the links I had with them]. 1 Jules Roy, pied-noir writer and veteran of the Second World War and Indochina, could have been speaking of Algeria when he claimed that: 'It was hardly worth going to war against the Nazis only to become the Nazis of Indochina.' 2 They had the taste for liberty, the sense of justice and the instinct for generosity. They wanted to create a multiracial, free, fraternal and prosperous society, to set an example for a world divided between rich and poor peoples. One word symbolised their ambition: 'integration'! Opposite under the striking red and green banner of Islam, the enemy preached racial hatred and religious fanaticism, the arbitrary terrorism of a one-party dictatorship. . . To win the hearts of the population, they turned themselves into medical orderlies, administrators, water irrigation project managers, overseers of the rural economy. . . To protect them, they also became policemen, judges and executioners. 3 conflict. These quotations exemplify the Manichean perspective that has framed the great bulk of writing on the Algerian War and the French army. It is a perspective that eschews complexity and divides the conflict into one between heroes and villains, black and white, good and evil. The war's messy realities become simplified into two polarized narratives where on one reading the French army are sadistic torturers waging a 'dirty war' and, on the other the National Liberation Front (FLN) are fanatical terrorists inflicting savagery upon defenceless civilians.
This edited collection rejects reductionist interpretations. Harnessing military and anti-war veterans' testimonies to the latest archive-based scholarship, it sets out to dissolve myths and misleadingly simplistic images. It embraces the complexity of events between 1954 and 1962, recognizing that the war underwent several phases and changed character more than once in these years. It does so in order to draw out the enormous diversity of experience, image and memory.
The war cannot be talked about in the singular; it must be talked about in the plural. The Algerian conflict was not just about war as military operations: it was also about battles over ideas, beliefs, loyalties, perceptions, traditions. In this collection, rethinking the war does not equate with rehabilitating any faction, interest group or myth; nor does it aim to rehabilitate the role of the French army in Algeria. Instead the aim was to go beyond polemic and recrimination and to seek greater understanding of the war's varied nuances. The more the war's complexities are researched, the more imaginative the questions asked of the experiences of the 'Algerian generation', the greater appear the ambiguities of that experience. It was sometimes terrifying, sometimes exhilarating, sometimes downright boring. Some French soldiers took part in major sweeps (opéra-tions de ratissage) in which units systematically combed the land in search of the enemy, and knew real fear; many more experienced the cafard and the ennui of long nights on quiet guard duties or manning undisturbed posts in the freezing chill of the desert. Thousands of Algerians were active members of the ALN, playing dangerous games of hide-and-seek in the streets and markets of Algiers, Oran, Constantine and Bône, or waging guerrilla war from hideouts in the ravines and caves of the Collo hills, the Kabylie and Aurès mountains. But some two million spent the war as internal refugees under armed guard, uprooted by the French military administration to resettlement camps (centres de regroupement) hundreds of kilometres from their homes. 4 Distinctive collective memories have developed on both sides of the Mediterranean since the war's end in 1962. Attempts to establish scholarly approaches ran up, for many years, against taboo subjects, such as the French army's use of torture, and state-sponsored myths that acquired the status of public articles of faith, 'invented traditions'. 5 In one case these illuminated the dawn of the Republic of Algeria; in the other, they revealed a France in the twilight of her imperial power, adjusting painfully to 'mere' hexagonal status as she rediscovered her identity as a European power.
Within the newly independent Algeria the war was glorified as a struggle for national liberation. The heroes were the ordinary people who had united behind the FLN. It was proclaimed as the war of 'one and a half million martyrs', the number officially claimed by the FLN to have been killed by the French between 1954 and 1962. Through the war Algeria had recovered national sovereignty and an Arabo-Islamic identity. These were the precise meanings given to the war after independence, and they became the founding images of new Algeria. 6 Teaching in schools and universities in Algeria after 1962 was closely monitored by the government. 7 The emphasis was placed on the outbreak of the nationalist action on 1 November 1954 and the role of the FLN. The contribution of all rival organizations (e.g. the MNA -Mouvement Nationaliste Algérien -and the PCA -Parti Communiste Algérien) was largely ignored. The Algerian people were constantly reminded that those who fought -those now in power -were the custodians of a historical memory. The dominant image propagated by the regime was that the Algerian people had united as one behind the revolution. 8 Thus the experience of pro-French Moslems which fractured this image of national consensus was suppressed. 9 Those who had not participated in securing national liberation could not challenge this. The myth of unity in the effort to throw off French shackles conferred legitimacy on the postindependence regime and at one and the same time denied legitimacy both to any potential rivals for power and potential alternative narratives of the course of the liberation struggle.
On the French side other legacies -but at least as many ambiguitiespersisted after the end of the war in 1962. Until June 1999 the events in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 were not officially recognized as a war. They were described as counter-insurgency operations or as a law-andorder problem. French governmental and military discourse labelled the ALN units and individuals as 'outlaws', 'brigands', 'rebels', 'terrorists', but systematically and deliberately denied them the status of warriors or combatants. 10 This non-recognition was a symptom of the way that, at an official level, the Algerian War became taboo. One French conscript was told, on being demobilized: 'You've seen a lot of things in Algeria. Don't talk about them in France, because that would only fuel the propaganda of the Communists and of bad Frenchmen, of the François Mauriac type.' 11 Those newspapers such as Le Monde and weekly journals critical of French atrocities in Algeria, Témoignage Chrétien, France-Observateur and L'Express, similarly attracted opprobrium from right-wingers devoted to Algérie Française, such as Jacques Soustelle, former Governor-General of Algeria, who described such publications as 'The big names in anti-French propaganda'. 12 However, as Mohammed Khane's chapter here demonstrates, Le Monde's position during the war was much less clearly oppositional, and its reputation as such was a self-congratulatory post hoc invention. 13 The 1980s saw attempts to view the war in a more detached manner. During the 30th anniversary commemoration in November 1984 an international conference took place in Algiers to assess the significance of 1954-62. Particular emphasis was placed on the international context. 14 At the end of the 1980s the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in France made a concerted effort to open out the Algerian War as a permissible and legitimate field of research. In this respect the Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent (IHTP) and Jean-Pierre Rioux were prime movers. They organized three conferences: the War and Christian Opinion; the War and Intellectuals; and the War and the French. 15 One aim was to encourage historians to go beyond public myths and polemic and to conduct comprehensive academic research. Another was to create a new climate of honesty and openness -no issue was to be taboo. Previously, most books were the work of participants. These, through their memoirs, sought to justify their actions and positions during the war. Rioux called for a more detached approach. In 1992 this was followed up by a large-scale conference on the memory and teaching of the war. 16 In 1999 the trial of Maurice Papon for his role in Jewish deportations from the Gironde in 1942-4 prompted other revelations about his responsibilities as Prefect of Police for the Seine (a post he assumed in March 1958) in the massacre of Algerians by Parisian police on 17 October 1961. 17 At the time the world was shown images by photo-journalists of the shocking violence perpetrated on the streets of Paris. 18 But there was little subsequent reportage, no historical investigation for thirty years and never a judicial inquiry -even though this bloodletting was later termed by a French lawyer 'the Krystallnacht of the Paris police'. 19 In a debate in the National Assembly in 2000, the French Communist Party (PCF) demanded a parliamentary commission of inquiry. Lionel Jospin, French prime minister at the time of the Papon trial, rejected this call. Instead he announced that access to the archives of the Algerian War would be widened. 20 For Jospin, it was the role of historians to subject the past to forensic scrutiny, a view confirmed by a Circular issued from the prime minister's office in April 2001. This instructed six ministries to ease access to official records relating to the Algerian War, Jospin adding the gloss that this be 'for historical research, in particular by people from the scholarly or university communities'. 21 Dominant official memories in France during the 1960s and 1970s could finally be modified, even rejected outright. The government had, in effect, given the green light to historians to challenge the previous 'authorized' history, a history synonymous with an uncritical narrative for the official view of France, the French cause and French wartime governments. Inevitably this earlier, 'received version' of France's conduct in Algeria had generated an officially sanctioned version of events in 1954-62 replete with anachronisms, omissions, decontextualization and 'state lies' (in the phrase of Jean-Luc Einaudi, the first to write a full-scale book about the 17 October 1961 atrocities). 22 'The national community', declared Jospin in November 2000, 'is not weakened by the act of remembering but, on the contrary, is reinforced.' 23 The Papon episode signalled a shift in France from facing up to the 'Vichy syndrome' to facing up to the nation's colonial equivalent. 24 Indicative of the warmer climate for historical research into the war was the international conference held on 23-25 November 2000, under 25 However, despite such revelations, a systematic, scholarly inquiry into these events and what Massu called a 'generalized use of torture' throughout French military operations remains blocked because the archives on the Battle of Algiersthe key episode in the torture controversy -are to remain closed until 2017. 26 Fresh research, particularly since the early-1990s, has stimulated new reflections and different understandings about the 1954-62 period. An example of this is the controversy as to the numbers killed. There is still no consensus on the total number of dead in all sorts of categories. First, as regards the French army's dead a figure of 17,456 was given currency by Alistair Horne in 1977 and was reproduced by John Talbott in 1980. 27 By 1998 this figure had been revised upwards to 23, 196 (of which about 15,000 in combat or assassinations). To take a specific and celebrated unit, the Foreign Legion lost 1,964 dead -many of whom though wearing French uniform had neither French nationality nor were likely to have set foot in France. 28 Additionally, losses on the French side should include those Muslims killed in French service: Algerian servicemen in the French army, native police, self-defence units, and the harkis (volunteer auxiliary infantry). Recent figures suggest that 3,267 police and self-defence personnel and 1,345 regular Muslim servicemen were killed. As for the harkis the work of Maurice Faivre has succeeded in quantifying quite accurately the numbers serving at particular dates, but has made little progress in determining precisely the number killed either in active service before 19 March 1962 or in the subsequent bloodletting of the purges in the first months of independence. 29 If death tolls have not readily found acceptance on the French side, how much more controversy surrounds the losses among Algerians. The issue is complicated by ambiguity over who had combatant status. The Algerian Ministry of War Veterans gives the figure of 152,863 FLN killed. 30 The death toll among Algerians as a whole will never be known accurately. These deaths, however, have been a crucial political and ideological weapon in the service of a founding national myth of sacrifice and Muslim unity in struggle -and death. This explains the figure of a 'million martyrs' once touted by Algeria's post-independence regime. Moreover, a lot of death was inflicted by Muslim on Muslim. One estimate, drawing on French figures, puts the number of Algerian civilian deaths at the hands of the FLN at 16,000. 31 Always a contentious issue, the battle over the death toll had led the French authorities to allege that the number the Algerians claimed were killed was vastly inflated for propaganda purposes. Asking how many were killed, and by whom, raises fundamental questions about the precise nature of the Algerian War. Historians face the task of setting the record straight about who killed whom. It is well enough known that harkis were killed in their thousands by the FLN during the French withdrawal in the summer of 1962. Much less familiar is that pied-noirs demonstrators were shot dead in a fusillade fired by French soldiers in the Rue d'Isly massacre of 26 March 1962, or 
Experiences
Wars are always about killing. They are also inevitably about battles over statistics, their meaning and their use. As discussed above, this was emphatically so in the case of the Algerian war: the legitimacy of the new regime rested on the legend of 'a million martyrs', the rank-and-file Algerian people whose blood was the price paid for independence and the mythic coagulant for subsequent national identity.
Publications in the later 1980s and 1990s have cast doubt on the earlier typology of the Algerian struggle as a uniquely savage, pointless, futile 'war with no name'. That characterization suggested a singularity to the Algerian conflict, setting it apart as a lived experience for the French troops. This now appears unconvincing the more the war recedes and its points of similarity with other twentieth-century conflicts -and their soldiers' experiences -can be discerned more clearly. Comparisons with other conflicts in the era of the world wars, and in the period of Cold War and decolonization after 1945, point to what was common, in whole or in part, with the Algerian experience. Indeed, the gradual lessening of polemics about the Algerian conflict suggests that the war's salient characteristics were on the whole unexceptional. This appears particularly so in a context of many wars of counter-insurgency and national liberation in Africa and Asia from the 1940s to the 1970s.
Generic problems of wars
Historical triumphalism
If ever there was an example of history being written by the victors, the history of wars is a quintessential case. However, this is typically just the first phase of a cycle of historicization. Each generation has its own vantage point on a past that becomes inevitably and legitimately more contested with the passage of time. Wars often wear an appearance of decisiveness to the participating generation. To succeeding generations, on the other hand, the outcomes seem less durable. To take the example of France and the First World War, the survivors of Maurice Genevoix's Ceux de 14 believed that their sacrifice had brought not only victory but an end to such slaughter -1914-18 as the war to end all wars. Much of the peacemaking at Paris in 1919 turned around visions of a new international order founded on arbitration and conciliation. For survivors of the combatant generation their victory was viewed as a triumph not merely over Germany but over war itself. 36 Few wars, however, could spawn such high-minded idealism from their combat veterans. Even in the case of the Great War, revisionism was well under way in less than a generation. The revival of a Europe arming to the teeth by the mid-1930s fuelled disillusionment, while the dissipation of the achievement of 1918-19 signalled the next cycle of historical perspective on the war. 37 For the Algerians, too, the war was historicized for a quarter-century in a triumphalist mode. Ageron has noted that the mythology of Algérie Française was replaced by a similar and equally powerful mythology, of Algérie algérienne. This in turn began to fracture from 1988 onwards. Now the war's losers, silenced for so long, could re-evaluate their experiences and present themselves in a different light. Martin Evans shows in his chapter here that the harkis, for so long rejected in both France and Algeria and condemned for having 'made the wrong choice', began to challenge the certainties of the Algerian independence narrative. The FLN's universalist or 'master' narrative began to fracture with the onset of the systemic crisis of the Algerian state signalled by the riots of October 1988. This permitted groups that had previously been dismissed, and silenced, as 'losers' to legitimately reclaim their history and thereby assert their group identity. An integral part of this process was the way the status of 'victimhood' became an empowering mechanism rather than an emblem of powerlessness. A shift took place into a new climate more sympathetic to pluralistic accounts of the war's experiences and postwar consequences. The shake-up of old certainties, not least in crisis-ridden Algeria in the 1990s, provoked new patterns of interpretation. This was perhaps most explicit in Stora's Les années algériennes, noteworthy for being based on inclusion of all perspectives, however divergent, however conflictual. It was indicative of a new climate of understanding in France. 38 The harkis were one example of how new technologies were used to document and commemorate a war record, and strengthen a group identity essential for claiming reparations, benefits and pensions from a begrudging French state. 39 
The question of memory and war
The issue of triumphalism leads into a further generic factor: the question of memory of war. The works of Jay Winter and Pierre Nora have pioneered the opening up of memory as a legitimate object of historical inquiry. 40 Henry Rousso makes the distinction between memory as the recreation of the past and the study of memory as an ongoing process -to the question 'what happened?' has been added the issue of how war has been remembered in monuments, personal testimony, film and fiction. The interest in remembering, and in the various, sometimes discordant, ways any past is remembered formed a starting point for this volume. A common thread is how the meanings and significance of the Algerian War have been subjected to continual reconstruction and reconfiguration. As the testimonies along with the chapters by Philip Dine and Martin Evans demonstrate, the memory of the Algerian War has been a battlefield with competing groups and individuals attempting to take possession of public space, print and broadcast media to project their versions of the past.
Cultures of killing
The work of Joanna Bourke has pointed towards the 'culture of killing' as a further general problem of war. She poses the question of how ordinary men are turned into killing machines. 41 Her work strikes important echoes with Christopher Browning's examination of the psychology of extermination among Germans on the Eastern Front in 1941-5. 42 Georges Mattéi's testimony here is powerfully revealing of similar pressures and processes that operated on the minds of French reservists and conscripts in Algeria: self-preservation, peer pressure, revenge, psychological conditioning by the army, prejudice, racism and the sheer discovered pleasure in killing. 43 Mattéi's recollections suggest how Algeria can be set in the generic context of anti-guerrilla warfare. Like Vietnam and like Britain's war against the Mau Mau in Kenya, Algeria witnessed a weakening of army morale accompanied by military frustration at constraining 'rules of engagement'. Like other counter-insurgency wars, Algeria was a conflict without front lines and without uniformed regular opponents. This increased the propensity of certain French units to perpetrate atrocities, further undermining the French claim to be fighting for a nobler cause and within the bounds of western norms and laws of war.
Civil-military relations
Tussles for control of war policy characterized both sides in Algeria. An ironic symmetry occurred the longer the war went on. In the French case, the army as a dissident force shot its bolt in Algeria, its excessively frequent and ill-judged interventions in politics being brought to an end by means of a thorough republicanization after the failed military coup of April 1961. 44 Conversely, on the Algerian side, the issue of the struggle for supremacy between the political and military wings was a source of tension throughout the war. In retrospect it is clear that by 1958 the 'civilian' leadership had been displaced by the military wing. It was a harbinger of the balance of power to come in the Algerian Republic. This split was not only civil and military, but also between the internal and external cadres. In a further irony, the very success of the Morice Line ensured the preponderance of the external over the internal because the six wilayas within Algeria were now isolated from the key bases of political power in Tunisia and Morocco.
Images of the enemy
Benjamin Stora has pointed the way towards 'image' as a rich seam for historians to exploit in respect of the Algerian War. 45 One significant aspect is how difficult it was for the French to construct images that would credibly demonize the FLN leadership. French propaganda sought early in the war to present ALN units as 'bandits', later as people led astray by unrepresentative 'agitators'. France's universalist tradition since 1789 equated soil to Frenchness -and all Algerians constitutionally lived on French territory. By contrast, French propaganda had been effective in the First World War and to an extent in 1939-40. Kaiser Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler were easy objects for lampooning and for serious propaganda that stressed their contempt for international law, treaties, the sovereignty of small nations and human rights. The dearth of hate-figures inside Algeria forced the French into alternative tactics. They targeted the FLN cadres sheltering in neighbouring Arab states as the tools of pan-Arabism (especially those in Egypt, excoriated as 'the sons of Cairo') and the FLN's external patrons (notably 'the demagogue Nasser'). Yet there was no escaping the problem that the shadowy FLN-ALN lacked prominent personalities ripe for demonization. Therefore visual propaganda's traditional tools -caricature and the ridicule of instantly recognizable enemy leaders -were weakened by the difficulty for France's war managers in identifying and vilifying the enemy in Algeria. The task of the bureau of psychological warfare therefore became more ambiguous and infinitely more difficult. As Nacéra Aggoun explains, 'the fellagha Arab guerrilla, used to symbolise the enemy, was depicted either as a faceless dark bulk with a human outline or as some sort of vermin'. To the end, however, the French faced the inescapable dilemma that some Arabs were friends while others were foes -and many were not clearly one or the other.
The examination of the propaganda struggles waged within the wider war for Algeria reveals further noteworthy aspects. 46 One is the concern of French politicians and colonial administrators about the potentially 'contagious' effects on the rest of the empire of violent campaigns for independence in French North Africa. Martin Shipway indicates in his contribution here that administrators fretted over 'contamination', nervously watching for signs of rising nationalist discontent in their territories. Officials, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, vigilantly monitored the 'capacity for dissidence' among local populations. Of particular interest were the groups living on the Saharan frontiers of 'black' and 'white' Africa, nomads whose loyalties lay more naturally to the north but whose political destiny was bound up in the sub-Saharan colonies. Colonial functionaries also worried that the emergent political elites might draw an example from Algeria's nationalism. Paradoxically, the Algerian War benefited the rest of French Africa in the sense that colonial administrators felt compelled to accelerate a managed and comparatively peaceful decolonization south of the Sahara from 1956; yet at this very moment the resolution of Algeria's own political future became ever more violently determined.
A second is that a comparable problem in aligning the 'home front' unambiguously behind the war effort existed in metropolitan France. There a vocal minority expressed support for the settlers. But even more clamorous groups of oppositionnels took a courageous public stand against French state policy and army torture, and in favour of Algerian independence. These ranged from students and intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Marcel Péju, André Mandouze, Maurice Audin and Francis Jeanson, to the secretive porteurs de valise. 47 In both the field of propaganda and the management of pressures for independence in Algeria, factors common to all wars were apparent. It is perennially difficult to gauge whether psychological/propaganda actions are having the intended effects on the target, and it seems that political solutions are often the children of contingent fleeting historical moments. Shipway cites the prescient words of the Ivory Coast leader Félix Houphouët-Boigny on 27 February 1956: 'Events in North Africa have revealed conclusively how a climate of confidence between metropolitan and overseas populations may be eroded almost irremediably [. . .] ; they also demonstrate how difficult it was subsequently to promote reform once passions have been allowed to run high.' The Algerian case shares with propaganda activities in all wars -hot as well as cold -the methodological weakness of excessive attention to the message of the propaganda product and insufficient attention to its impact on the targeted population. The reception of French psychological offensives and propaganda among the Muslim population is, as Aggoun concludes, an aspect demanding further research.
Specificities of the war in Algeria
As they were sucked into the new war in Algeria, French army officers responsible for training troops sought to learn, integrate and apply the supposed 'lessons' from counter-insurgency warfare in Indochina. 48 But as the chapter here by Alexander J. Zervoudakis shows, this was problematic. The terrain and climatic conditions differed sharply, of course. So did the attitudes of French politicians and public opinion, in part because Indochina was a distant colony whereas Algeria was constitutionally a part of metropolitan France and comparatively close to home. In Indochina, furthermore, there had been hints that the grand and noble ideals underpinning the raison d'être and purpose of the French military in earlier conflicts were now luxuries and must be jettisoned. In Algeria issues became much starker, French retaliation after FLN-ALN actions typically taking the form of the retribution of the mailed fist undisguised by any velvet glove. 49 Yet there was no existential threat to French civilization, no clear and present danger to Provençaux or Parisians. To be sure, certain French officers sought to portray fellagha bands in apocalyptic terms. Their discourse depicted the counter-insurgency effort as a new crusade on the outer rampart of the defences of the West. Nevertheless, French hearts and minds proved resistant in the main to such crude attempts to raise the stakes. In practice parliamentarians, press and protesters all discerned the absence of clearly defined French war aims. This contrasted with the ALN-FLN's short-term fixity of purpose (independence). However, it is clear that the Algerian War did have its own characteristics and peculiarities.
Disputed beginnings and endings
At the time, and for many years afterwards, no agreement existed on dating either the war's beginning or its end. There was no declaration of war. Indeed, as noted already, the French steadfastly refused to acknowledge a state of war at all. The disputed beginning had its counterpoint in the contested ending. For some -mostly French -the struggle began with the wave of bomb attacks on French installations and pied-noir settlements on the night of All Saints 1954. But for many Algerian nationalists, the armed struggle predated this by almost ten years, being recognized as starting in the Sétif massacre of May 1945. As regards the war's termination, Algerian nationalists have commemorated 19 March 1962 (the date of the ceasefire) and 1 July 1962 (Algerian independence). The French, however, have not yet officially found a date that commands any national consensus. Consequently the war's end goes unmarked by France -even if at regional levels, left-leaning local veterans' associations have had some success in securing commemorative ceremonies and even street name changes adopting the 'radical' date of 19 March 1962 . Yet for other départe-ments of a more conservative political cast, that date remains unacceptable, decried as a national dishonour and capitulation.
An undeclared war and a problem of morale
A further, connected specificity was that the lack of any declaration of war contributed to the demotivation of much of the French army. This was especially true among reservists and conscripts. It also hampered French authorities in their endeavours to mobilize public opinion in favour of the war effort, since officially there was no war.
Specificities of time, place and military branch
Several factors in the nature of the conflict defined individuals' experiences, as François Sirkidji's testimony explains. The war was multi-faceted. It can help to distinguish three major subdivisions in the nature of the experience for French combatants: first temporal; second spatial -urban counter-terrorism, mountains, plains; third formational -branch/type of service.
Taking the first of these, it is crucial to acknowledge the considerable variations that marked the phases of the war. Periodization is necessarily open to debate. But historians generally now agree on the existence of five distinct phases to the Algerian conflict. Phase one extended from 1954 (the outbreak of the 'rebellion') to the parliamentary elections of 2 January 1956. Phase two ran from Guy Mollet's call-up of the reservists in the spring of 1956 to the Battle of Algiers in 1957. Phase three extended from late 1957 to de Gaulle's sidelining of General Raoul Salan in the autumn of 1958. Phase four saw the Challe and Constantine Plans 1959-60 -the twin-track strategy of defeating the ALN through massive military operations while simultaneously using large-scale financial infrastructural investment to 'win hearts and minds'. Phase five was the endgame in 1961-2, when the key issue became the timing and the terms on which France would quit Algeria.
Periodization is a key to a more nuanced, convincing analysis of attitudes among each identifiable constituency with a stake in the Algerian War: French servicemen, the settlers and Algerians, both ALN and noncombatants. For French servicemen, as Jean-Charles Jauffret's chapter here suggests, periodization mattered intensely: the Algerian garrison that faced the first wave of ALN violence in 1954-5 was a professional force, but needed to learn counter-guerrilla tactics. Later, the reservists who arrived in 1956 had to polish up their rusty military skills and undergo fitness training to meet the arduous conditions. Conscripts, drafted for service in their hundreds of thousands from 1957 onwards, experienced the transient friendships of the troop train and the comradeship of basic training. Periodization mattered down to the war's very vocabulary -the discourse and expressions of Indochina, and even of 1914-18, were current in the first stages in Algeria. Little by little, however, the war generated its own terminology and slang. As the war dragged on into 1958-9 (the fifth year and beyond), it also became routinized. The length of compulsory military service turned the troops' minds to surviving the daily round and accustomed them to the normalization of active service. It also dulled consciences to the brutalization of relations with the Muslim population, as Mattéi, Roy and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, from their divergent political stances, all publicly lamented. 50 For settlers, the passage of time also produced a radicalizing effect. Piednoirs leaders gradually lost faith that an electoral-administrative settlement could be reached that would preserve their privileges and also restore tranquillity between Muslims and Europeans. They became angrier. In 1960, fearing a sell-out by de Gaulle, they founded the OAS (Organisation Armée Secrète) as a diehard body to fight ruthlessly to preserve French Algeria. 51 For Muslim Algerians the war was an itinerary, quite literally so for those force-marched from their villages to the resettlement centres. For FLN cadres the itinerary commonly saw a move from armed struggle in 1954-7 to wider and more sophisticated forms of political action at the national, and increasingly international, levels. Attention to period also suggests the Algerian nationalist leadership's skill in adapting successfully to the defeat of their initial campaigns, reliant as those were on guerrilla attacks and urban bombings. Hard pressed by ruthless and effective French counterinsurgency tactics, the FLN deftly reversed the sequence of revolutionary liberation struggles prescribed by Mao, the armed strikes of the earlier years giving way almost entirely to political, diplomatic and propaganda offensives by 1960-2. This radical, intelligent and unconventional reordering of the classical phases of revolutionary war was disconcerting in the extreme -indeed literally disarming -for the French. 52 Taking the second specificity -that of space and place -it mattered enormously for the soldiers' experience whether they were in the front line or in garrison duties in 'quiet' rear areas, such as guarding civilian or military facilities (hospitals, electricity substations, etc). Some men saw action and guns fired in anger; others played soccer or rugby to while away their time. For some the predominant memory of the war is of boredom; for others it is terror and revulsion. The banality of some soldiers' experience is perhaps brought home by the little known fact that 4,500 troops from the metropole, 800 legionnaires and 900 Muslims in regular French units died not as a result of enemy fire but in accidents (in training, at target-practice and especially in road accidents). 53 At a less existential level, postwar memories were shaped by whether a soldier served in an urban setting, engaging in patrols, street searches and counter-terrorist missions, or whether he saw action in the Saharan desert or in the mountains. The war's character was not monolithic and singular. It was diverse and variegated. In place as well as in time, service in Algeria could separate veterans as often as bind them. In one respect, however, there was broad consensus: that the encounter with the pied-noirs settlers, whom the soldiers had been ostensibly sent to 'protect', was a disillusioning experience. Most reservists and conscripts were greeted coolly by the European community. This seems to have resulted from a deep-seated tension between the settlers' desire for greater security on the streets of Algeria's cities and their desire for a normal way of life to be restored, free from the disconcerting, visible militarization of their security.
Taking the third specificity, varieties of experience could be sharply differentiated according to the branch of service one was in -Foreign Legion, army, navy, air force, gendarmerie. Each service had its own culture and traditions, its own esprit de corps and military role. Inter-arm command existed at the highest level (the Algerian theatre of operations). Yet it was rarely reflected in genuine combined operations or shared tasks, other than for short-lived specific missions. The navy had a greater role than has been acknowledged. 54 It formed a 'northern barrier' to complement the frontier barrages facing Morocco and Tunisia, blocking the coastal ingress of supplies and arms to the ALN. The paratroops were generally France's most idealistically committed servicemen. Gilles Perrault joined them because of the pride he took in them as the vanguard of the French army that had liberated the mother country in 1944. Hélie de SaintMarc, too young to have fought in the defeat of 1940, had resisted the Germans in occupied France and been interned in Buchenwald. Toughened in these personal fires, he became an unyielding defender of what he regarded as French national interest and military honour -Algeria was French and he was ready to risk all to prevent another defeat besmirching the army's reputation. 55 For many officers, Algeria was the place to draw a line: no more retreats, no more defeats. For colonialist officers, memories of the key role played by the overseas territories in helping liberate metropolitan France in 1944 remained powerful. The empire's continuation was a sine qua non, for them, of French great power status. For ideologues motivated by anti-communism, the struggle in Algeria was about barring the road to a Red Tide sweeping across the emergent nations of the Third World. Algeria was therefore a struggle on behalf of 'Western Civilization', the French army acting as latter-day Roman 'centurions', in Jean Lartéguy's evocative term, to protect NATO and the West. 56 In French political circles there were those who viewed Algerian issues through the prism of the appeasement era and the Second World War. Those like Mollet, the leader of the SFIO socialist party, believed that the French settlers should not be sold out as the Czechs had been in 1938. President René Coty in 1957 invoked the memory of Verdun as a rallying call to justify why France must win in Algeria: the French Republic's integrity was in danger. Similar sentiments motivated François Mitterrand of the UDSR, the minister of the interior. He shared the left's commitment to the unity of the Republic and declared, apropos the FLN, that 'one does not negotiate with rebels'. Even the PCF's stance was ambiguous in the early years of the conflict, not least because it believed in the army-nation bond and the obligations of citizenship. 57 Hence its opposition to army desertions. Some civilians-in-uniform -such as the reservist Georges Mattéi -experienced a queasy feeling of being 'on the wrong side' as their commanders made them routinely carry out arrests, torture, atrocities and war crimes ('everyday Oradours') in the name of the Republic.
There was another dimension too: French men growing up in the 1950s were acutely aware of the embarrassing record of their Second World War forebears. Most Frenchmen had been denied the opportunity to fight from 1940 to 1945. This left a generational caesura among males of a nation whose men had, in the main, previously defined their patriotism and masculinity by their status in young manhood as citizens-in-uniform . The sons and nephews of the 'lost warriors' of 1940-5 were those called on to defend the Republic in Algeria. In the person of 'Marianne', republican France assumed a symbolic feminine embodiment. But national identity in the first half of the twentieth century was strongly influenced by a masculine, modernist norm in the specific shape of the man-in-uniform, the citizen-soldier. Awkwardly, however, the brevity of the campaigns involving mass French armies in 1940 and 1944-5 meant France possessed (in quite another sense to that meant by Marc Bloch, the originator of the phrase) a 'generation with a guilty conscience'. 58 Humiliations in Europe in 1940-4 and in Indochina ten years later placed a quasi-moral obligation on young Frenchmen to rise to the challenge of this new threat to the nation. The conventional way to do so was by the expression of their masculinity and power in undertaking military service in Algeria. Thus was born 'the Djebel generation'. 59 The children of 1939-45 felt compelled to eradicate the stigma of inaction attaching to the generation of their fathers and uncles. 60 Prominent though the reservist and conscript protesters were, they remained a minority. If those going to Algeria risked physical emasculation, it was a moral emasculation to which those who refused the call to arms appeared destined. Georges Mattéi, a Corsican reservist who was served his call-up papers while in Italy in April 1956, testifies to this. He has explained elsewhere that: 'What prompted him to return was the wish to experience war for himself. He felt unmanly because he had missed out on World War Two. Now, through the Algerian War, he wanted to overcome this complex and prove his self worth.' Mattéi's thirst for action arguably assumed an alternative, subversive form in his subsequent fight against torture and the perversion of the ideals of the Republic that he witnessed in Algeria. Mattéi recounted years later that 'despite being fascinated by the idea of combat, he was at the forefront of such protests'. 61 As in other respects, the Algerian War contained its ambivalences: this time Frenchmen went to war en masse but found themselves fighting the wrong war, a dirty war (albeit, as one embittered conscript reflected, 'examples of "clean" wars must be pretty rare'). 62 It was paradoxical that young men of military age in 1956-62 felt angry at having to serve in an ignoble and increasingly controversial cause, whereas the previous generation had been angry at being denied service in the noble cause of French Liberation. As Brigitte Rollet's chapter here shows, the director André Téchiné used his film Les Roseaux sauvages to explore how young Frenchmen and women of the late 1950s and early 1960s had to define masculinity, explore their sexuality and ritualize their passage from teens to adulthood against the backdrop of Algeria.
By the fifth and final phase of the war, in 1961-2, conscripts were less inclined than ever to risk death merely to strengthen the hand of Louis Joxe, Bernard Tricot and Robert Buron, de Gaulle's negotiators at the ceasefire talks in Evian. 63 Veterans of Algeria felt they belonged to a 'sacrificed generation'. They discovered, on demobilization, that their country intended only to forget what they had gone through and sink into a collective amnesia. 64 This was encouraged from the highest levels of the Fifth Republic, for de Gaulle had no interest in remembering Algeria. In 1961-2 he turned his back on empire as the touchstone of French grandeur.
Political elites were similarly silenced: the Gaullist UNR loyally supported the general's policies of nuclearization and European leadership. The SFIO and its allies were discredited by their dismal record of about-turns and incompetence in directing the war effort. The PCF lacked credibility when, in 2000, it demanded an inquiry into the French army's conduct and the question of torture, and urged compensation for French victims of the war -for it had voted emergency powers to Mollet's government in spring 1956. This was the very act that had opened the way to the dispatch of some two million conscripts to Algeria over the six remaining years of war.
Isolation
A further specificity of the Algerian War, one particularly prominent in memoirs of French professional officers, is the feeling of 'France alone' (la France seule). France felt that she was fighting 'a war without allies'. This had much truth -although Yahia Zoubir has noted that the USA did not completely renounce support for France. Some Americans were aware of the sensitivities of their French allies. A National Security Council report of November 1959 noted:
The French government and a large segment of French opinion bitterly feel that the United States fails to give all-out support to its NATO ally in a place where critical French interests are at stake and when Frenchmen are being killed daily. There is French resentment concerning the activities of the FLN representatives in the United States and there is some suspicion that the United States actually intends eventually to supplant French influence in North Africa. 65 In the main, however, the ambivalence of American spokesmen and the periodic criticism of French policy in Washington -over and above the more predictable censure from Moscow -irritated and discouraged French military leaders. 66 After all, France had been supplied and assisted militarily by powerful coalitions in 1914-18, 1939-40, 1944-5. Even in the Indochina war the US bankrolled over 70 per cent of the financial costs of the French military effort. 67 Never in her modern wars did France have fewer friends than during the Algerian crisis.
Algerian experiences
Until the late 1990s and Ageron's path-breaking conference, La Guerre d'Algérie et les Algériens, North African experiences of the conflict were overshadowed by a mountain of memoirs and scholarship on the French side of the war. Political censorship in Algeria made publication of memoirs there at best risky and at worst impossible. Fear was a factor from the 1960s to the 1980s, with the murder of some key actors such as Belkacem Krim. Algerian scholars such as Mohamed Harbi occasionally published in France. 68 But others felt that to do so was an act of betrayal. A few memoirs were published such as those of the leaders Yacef Saadi and Si Azzedine. But little emerged about the experiences of rank-and-file ALN soldiers.
Recent research has attempted to redress the balance. Some work has appeared that sheds light on the recruitment, training, strategies and tactics of the fellaghas, the Algerian fighters. 69 Like the French, the Algerians found the war a variegated and shapeless experience, often determined by spatial considerations -in short, where in the country they found themselves at any given moment. The French frontier defences -the Morice Line erected in 1957-8 along the Algerian-Tunisian border in the east and the comparable barrier built on the frontier with Morocco to the west -effectively separated Algerian nationalists of the interior from those based externally. The various sects or 'clans' of FLN-ALN militants faced ever greater obstacles to close and frequent contact with one another.
At a military level, this affected operations and tactics during the war. It also prepared the way for postwar antipathies and political rivalries. While the conflict was still in progress, the sealing off of the 'PoliticoAdministrative Organization' (OPA) inside Algeria from the leadership cadres in Morocco, such as Colonel Houari Boumediène's 'Oujda clan', and those in Tunisia, gave a significant edge to those based externally. Reminding some observers of the experience of the French Resistance in 1940-4, the FLN-ALN resistance located outside Algeria enjoyed the benefits of several crucial assets. These included secure training camps, arms supplies from friendly powers (East Bloc countries, Morocco, Egypt), access to Third World diplomatic support, radio broadcasting facilities and coverage from the international media. 70 None of these assets was available to the hard-pressed ALN bands within Algeria. This became particularly true as the noose thrown around them by General Maurice Challe's operations tightened in 1959-60. Further undermining the integrity and military effectiveness of the internal OPA/ALN was the infiltration by Captain Paul Léger's undercover agents, 'les bleus', into the OPA in the Casbah during the Battle of Algiers in 1957. Léger's operatives were mostly former ALN militants whom he 'turned', often under coercion. He then sent them back among their erstwhile comrades to sow distrust by planting false documents, spreading rumours and provoking arrests. A bloody turmoil ensued. ALN leaders such as Amirouche responded by unleashing a wave of beatings, throat-cuttings and disembowellings to silence suspected double-agents -most of whom were loyal to the nationalist cause but could not prove it. Léger took satisfaction from watching the FLN-ALN cadres eliminate each other, effectively doing his work for him. 71 Léger's operation was part of a larger tactical symbiosis between the French army and the ALN. This symbiosis saw the latter's tactics define those of their opponent in an ever expanding and ever more violent circle.
Grasping that ALN strategy and operational methods, and those of the French, were in a permanent state of interconnectedness is essential for an understanding of the war experiences of both adversaries. Each fed off the other. This created a pattern of action and reaction, challenge, response and counter-response that was one of the conflict's defining characteristics. The FLN emerged in 1954 from an impasse within the traditional nationalist organizations led by Messali Hadj and Ferhat Abbas. It represented a new generation of activists who rejected compromise with the colonial authorities. For them the armed struggle was the only way ahead. However, in espousing violence, the younger insurgent leaders, including Belkacem Krim, Mohamed Boudiaf and Yacef Saadi, retained a realistic appreciation of the military balance of power. They were pitting the fellaghas against the fourth largest army in the world in terrain that generally favoured the French. In contrast to the jungle of Indochina, which the Vietminh exploited so successfully first against the French then against the Americans, the open scrub and the vast desert expanses of Algeria offered few military advantages for guerrillas. The objective of most FLN leaders was, therefore, to win a political victory. They sought to create a climate of insecurity that would bring Algeria to the attention of the world, and assert a moral claim for independence that would isolate France diplomatically. Within this single-minded political strategy that recognized how favourable votes in the United Nations would matter as much as military successes, the FLN forged a unity of purpose that rejected attempts to lure them into even a 'paix des braves' as proposed by de Gaulle in 1958. 72 Given that many FLN leaders were not only veterans from the French army, most famously Boudiaf and Ahmed Ben Bella, but also MTLD activists, it is not surprising that they synthesized these two experiences in order to organize the ALN militarily. Borrowing directly from the MTLD's organization, Algeria was divided into six wilayas. Subsequently, metropolitan France was designated the 'seventh wilaya' when the FLN stepped up its action and took the fight to the French mainland. 73 The substructures of the light company (katibas of 100 men) and section (faileks of 30 men) were modelled on French military practice. Rapidly the wilayas assumed the status of fiefdoms, fratricidal conflict plaguing ALN military strategy from start to finish. At the heart of this conflict were questions of arms, supplies and authority. In-fighting also arose from the issue of legitimacy -progenitors of the FLN versus the new wave of leaders, imprisoned versus free, military versus political. Later, with the Morice Line's construction, this translated into a split between internal and external resistance that continued beyond the war against the French into the power struggle within the new Republic of Algeria.
Yet across these internecine divisions the ALN maintained the dynamics of their strategy. In the first phase we have delineated, from November 1954 to August 1955, the ALN struggled to win support among the Muslims and used selective attacks to sow hatred between settler and native all across Algeria. In the second phase, poor coordination between the wilayas played into the French army's hands and prompted the launch of the August 1955 uprising as the best form of defence. In the third phase, the expansion of French forces through deployment of the reservists put intolerable pressure on the rural ALN. In response to this crisis, FLN leaders conferred in the Soummam valley in August 1956 and decided to launch the Battle of Algiers. 74 The major strike called among Muslim workers in Algiers in January 1957 prompted discussion of the emergency at the United Nations. In the fourth phase the FLN response to de Gaulle's return to power in France in May 1958 was to proclaim the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), along with which went the ascendancy of Boumediène as power shifted to the externally based militants in Tunisia and Morocco. To those who paused from chasing fugitive fellagha bands, it was clear that the war would be decided politically, not militarily.
In the military-operational cycle already discussed, these strategies framed the French response. Given the nature of guerrilla war, the hunt for ALN combatants became ever more refined and efficient. A vast and sophisticated French military effort was applied to intelligence-gathering and operations, especially in 1959-60 under Challe's command. The French isolated and destroyed any ALN units foolhardy enough to make a stand; greatly superior in mobility as well as firepower, they caught, trapped and annihilated others that sought refuge in flight. The cat-andmouse game played out between ALN and French army units in 1954-5 had something of the sporting quality of the hunter and his quarry seen in France in 1944 between the collaborationist Vichy milice and the Resistance maquis. But there was no longer a contest during the latter phases in Algeria. If the discourse of field sports and the chase occasionally marked the vocabulary of France's counter-insurgency officers, the sport had by 1960-1 become a totally one-sided chasse aux fells.
The schism between internal and external FLN-ALN cadres, initially of a military nature, developed into a key legacy for subsequent Algerian politics and society. For, in a stroke of irony, the Algerian external resistance triumphed in 1962 (and more obviously after Boumediène's coup of 1965), just as de Gaulle had successfully exerted his leadership over the internal French Resistance in 1944-5. Yet even the ALN's problems contained certain advantages. For one thing, the French lost much goodwill by their practice of securing the Algerian civilian population by means of herding them into centres de regroupement. These were compared to the German concentration camps of the Second World War. As many as two million Algerians, it is estimated, were relocated -often to camps hundreds of kilometres from their homes, their villages, grazing or farmland. 75 So politically and socially shattering were the consequences that the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called the resettlements the 'End of a World' for Algerian social hierarchy and stability. 76 The experiences of the centres during the war turned many Algerians not previously active in -or even sympathetic to -the FLN/ALN into newly radicalized men and women forcibly pulled up from the roots in their own land. The 130 years of French rule had hitherto left most Muslim Algerians surprisingly untouched. This was underlined in a report published in 1957 by the ethnologist Germaine Tillion. She highlighted the chronically undeveloped condition and poor nutrition of the people, and how 94 per cent of Muslim men and 98 per cent of Muslim women were illiterate in French in 1954, with only one male Muslim child in five and one female Muslim child in 16 receiving any schooling. 77 The new social relationships thrown up by camp life were remarked on, as Nacéra Aggoun explains, by the sociologists Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad. In their book, Le déracinement, published in 1964 after fieldwork in the resettlement villages, they showed how French population policy backfired disastrously. 78 The repression's severity and the Nazi-style forced relocations of so many people produced a paradox: France achieved a military victory in Algeria in 1959-60, but at the price of a massive alienation and radicalization of the Muslim population. 79 It was, of course, precisely the latter's support and loyalty to France that was the most crucial factor in determining Algeria's political future.
Images
Images of the Algerian War were multi-dimensional, overlapping and ambiguous. Three in particular were crucial: the pre-existing, subliminal image of Algeria as a country; the image of its Arab peoples; and the consciously manufactured image of the French soldier as friend, fighter and personification of France Similarities between France and Algeria (constitutionally part of France) were evoked even in the sea-crossing for the troops who embarked at Marseilles. The vistas of the Vieux Port of Marseilles and the Rade d'Alger, the strikingly similar urban architecture, the shimmering, sunlit public spaces, all contrived to ease the transition from metropole to Maghreb. Even the voyage itself left a seamless sense of Frenchness undisturbed as soldiers moved ashore and saw sights of reassuring familiarity. Disembarking on the Mediterranean's southern shore, the impression and ambience was of having moved place but not country. This was exactly as officialdom intended, une seule France indeed. 80 As Soustelle, GovernorGeneral in 1955, declared -his words a banner headline in the leading pied-noir newspaper, L'Echo d'Alger -'France will no more quit Algeria than Provence or Brittany'. 81 This was given concrete expression -literally -by the network of small forts, blockhouses and strong points that the French scattered across Algeria as a 'symbol of territorial presence ' and control. 82 For the early reinforcements sent south in 1954-6, such prior mental images as they possessed of Algeria may have derived chiefly from impressions gained by watching cinema newsreels. 83 In this first phase of the war even North Africa's most distinctive elements -a camel caravan, Arab beggar boys, a souk and a méchoui -appeared charming, unthreateningly exotic. Just as the popular postcards on sale at the Marseilles dockside had hinted, Algeria appeared quaintly touristic and folkloric. Even beyond the settled coastal conurbations, once troops found themselves deployed inland, Algeria's landscape at first appeared harsh yet noble, almost a transplanted French civilization burnished by sunshine, luxuriant in its orange groves and palm trees. 84 Moreover, and paradoxically, Algeria was presented in a Christianized mythologization not as an Arabo/Islamic land but, predominantly, as a foyer of Gallo-Roman Mediterranean civilization. In an extension of the myth embraced by professional officers, the fight in Algeria was depicted as a last-ditch defence of western civilization, barring the way to the latterday 'Communist barbarians' at the gates. This imagery was made to do duty throughout the Algerian War. In this myth the majority Muslim population was peaceable, intrinsically loyal and needed only effective protection by France. This image altered sharply from 1959 onwards when the struggle became more desperate and slipped into appalling brutalities as Algérie Française diehards adopted the discourse of apocalyptic threats crashing against the ramparts of Eurafrica. But for as long as possible the French encouraged traders to sell postcards that depicted Roman ruins, classical architecture and the buildings of the Algerian cities with their sparkling, whitewashed façades. Much of this suggested to French troops and administrators, especially those from the Midi, ways in which Algeria was an extension of their own homeland with the aquaducts at the 'picturesque Roman ruins of Tipaza', for instance, evoking those of the Gard. 85 Sooner or later, however, for most French troops, Algeria's spell as a romantic and exotic land of tourism rather than terrorism was shattered. The sight and sound of ambulances and police cars, sirens wailing as they raced to a bar torn apart by an FLN bombing, or the shock at seeing victims of throat-cutting or disembowelling, brought naive French soldiers face to face with an 'other' Algeria. This was a violent and terrifying place. The fellagha guerrilla replaced the street-vendors of jasmine and oranges as the 'new type Arab' in the visual imaginary of French troops. Furthermore, many French soldiers found the Algerian countryside wild and forbidding. Far from a land of sunshine, troops deployed into the higher ranges of the Aurès, Atlas and Collo mountains experienced bitingly cold winds, freezing nights and snow in a landscape severe enough to test the stamina of the fittest regular paratroops or legionnaires. Inhospitable terrain was regarded as a friend to the fellaghas, a foe to French troopers. All the same, Philip Dine has noted that the experience of most conscripts in Algeria was 'singularly lacking in danger'. 86 Less than 10 per cent of French forces did much fighting. Most were dispersed in static duties, defending telephone exchanges, power stations, protecting property, public buildings and port facilities.
The second image, that of 'the Arab', cast its shadow naturally enough over the French soldiers who experienced the Algerian War. In the conflict's first phase the troops stationed in Algeria were accustomed to day-to-day contact with the indigenous Muslims. They had, after all, been on garrison duties in the Maghreb for months, even years; some had been on active service in Morocco and Tunisia during the independence struggles of those countries from 1952 to 1956. The deterioration of relationships between the indigenous peoples and Europeans, both settlers and troops, was gradual. It occurred in part from the crude conflation of all native North Africans into the increasingly pejorative term 'Arabs', distinctions between true Arabs and Berbers being lost. Even then the deterioration was neither linear nor universal. Some parts of the immense country continued to enjoy peacetime relations between colonized and colonizers for a year or more after the 1954 start to the FLN-ALN rising. Though requiring much more research into particular local experiences, and a sensitivity to the chronological dislocations, it seems that a kind of normality, or at least no worsening of relations, persisted between Muslims and French security personnel until the wholesale expansion of French forces in 1956. 87 However, as Nacéra Aggoun demonstrates, things changed dramatically in 1956 and 1957 with the mass arrivals of the reservists and conscripts. These men did not know North Africa, and many did not wish to. Their preconceptions about Muslim customs and characteristics, indeed about the value of France's overseas territories as a whole, derived from pre-existing naive idealizations. These ideas were promoted in their primary schools in the metropole in the 1940s and early 1950s. The lingering images that the young conscripts carried in their minds were paternalistic and colonialist: the dutiful natives of France overseas, 'the children of Greater France'. Alongside this coexisted a commonplace romanticization of the Maghreb and its peoples as an 'exotic', 'Oriental other'.
Philip Dine reminds us of the well-established literary preoccupation in western culture with the supposed charms of the harem and the slave market. At a crude level French squaddies found Algerian service tantalizing: it hinted at masculine bonding and adventures abroad with the scarcely veiled prospect of sexual 'eastern promise'. 88 As it had done for the men of the British army in 1914, instructed by Kitchener on how to behave towards French civilians, for the British and Anzac troops in Egypt in 1915 and for US soldiers encountering the women of Vietnam in the 1960s, military duty overseas set pulses racing among young men posted far from home. The encounter between the French army's citizen-soldiers and Algeria contained paradoxes. Danger and boredom were offset by the possibilities of sexual adventure. In a more Islamic location such as Algeria, realization occurred only in soldiers' fantasies; yet incidents of rape were cited and the more predatory dimensions to Franco-Arab encounters require further research.
Civilians-in-uniform drafted to Algeria had some awareness of the overseas populations, left over from the Second World War (when colonial and North African detachments had played a high-profile role in the Liberation of France in 1944). But few had first-hand experience. The peoples of Algeria were a foreign 'other'. Dimly aware of this, and the potential for ignorant and often reluctant soldiers to worsen rather than ease tensions, the French military authorities sought to educate and prepare troops for Algerian service. They did so at a banal level by issuing simplistic cartoon manuals, providing simple phrases in Arabic thought likely to assist the soldier in daily dealings with the native inhabitants, instructing troops how to treat the Arab population and enjoining them to respect local traditions, customs and dress.
Of course many thousands of Muslims also served France, acting as its agents in the diverse operations to restore and preserve security in the face of the FLN-ALN operations. As Martin Evans's chapter explains, there were at least four main categories of Muslims in the French security services. These were the GADs (groupes d'auto-défense) or self-defence groups; the mokhaznis or local militias, charged with village security under the direction of the SAS teams; Muslim regular troops in the French army itself; and the harkis, the volunteer auxiliaries. The harkis were especially vaunted by officers strongly committed to French Algeria, who idealized them as the embodiments of French assimilationist policy. Harkis were said to personify a future for Algeria rooted in a mutually supportive and amicable Franco-Muslim partnership. The 'Algerianization' of the war in 1959 and 1960 was a cornerstone of Challe's strategy to assume the offensive, pacify the country and eliminate the ALN's capacity for action. To achieve this, a dramatic expansion of harki strength from some 26,000 to 60,000 occurred. For certain commanders, such as Challe, Massu and Hélie de Saint-Marc, praise for the harkis became sentimental and self-deluding. 89 At independence, these officers were tormented by a sense of betrayalaghast that they could not honour their promises to safeguard the harkis' future, and convinced that their own honour had been sullied by de Gaulle's 'retreat' to 'the hexagon' that left the harkis at the mercy of the new masters of 'Algerian Algeria'. 90 In practice, as Evans notes, the settlers always had misgivings about confiding their security to thousands of armed Muslim auxiliaries, and the tactic got a much cooler reception among the pied-noirs than in the French army. In the war's aftermath, harkis were some of the most forgotten participants. Although 68,000 harki soldiers escaped to France between April and August 1962, about 100,000 more were left behind and killed within nine months. De Gaulle, 'in a hurry to close the Algerian file', officially discouraged the harkis from fleeing to France. Subsequent presidents were equally neglectful of the harkis and their families, reckoned by 1991, when they rioted in Narbonne and Carcassonne for rights and recognition, to number 450,000. 91 The third image, the army's depiction of itself, was sedulously controlled and skilfully disseminated. At the heart of this enterprise was the army's own public relations office, the SIRPA, and photographic bureau, the ECPA. Commonplace illustrations included famous generals decorating infantrymen after action, presentations of new weapons and colours to Muslim auxiliaries, squads of heroic-looking soldiers (often atop rugged mountainous terrain), French superior technology in operation (typically helicopters) and the idealistic young SAS pacification officer surrounded by 'his villagers'. 92 These agencies, furthermore, worked closely with masscirculation news magazines, notably Paris-Match: first to ensure the desired representation of the army's tasks and demeanour; second to market these images to the metropolitan taxpayer and voter -increasing numbers of whom were simultaneously parents of the troops. 93 Many of these images were, inevitably, caricatures. The army command offered a demonic portrayal of the FLN as a fanatical minority, the tools of Nasser and of Communism. Against their barbarous nihilism, the army propagandists sought to make young French troops feel themselves to be the shields of civilization, bulwarks against militant Islam and the obscurantism of the Orient. This state of mind was apparent quite early in the war among the professional and elite units. Pierre Hovette, a company commander in the 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment operating in the Constantinois and the Kabylie hills in late 1955, welcomed the challenge of restoring a French physical presence and a climate of security in what had, since November 1954, become a 'no-go' area. He recalled how his men relished their 'chance to show [. . .] critics that the paras are capable of succeeding at something besides war'. 94 If oversimplified, monochrome images of friendly Muslims tended to prevail on the French side, FLN mythmakers also presented a one-dimensional tableau of an 'Algerian people' united to expel the French. Gillo Pontecorvo's film, The Battle of Algiers (1965) did not deal in caricatures. As Hugh Roberts notes, its documentary style recreates the struggle in the Casbah among the labyrinthine, dark, narrow streets from January to September 1957 -arguably the pivotal event of the Algerian War. The filmmaker sought to convey the motivations of all sides in the conflict; in this, however, Pontecorvo was making an exception that proved the rule.
In the treatment of gender as a dimension to the conflict, Pontecorvo showed how burdensome a myth the French had constructed for themselves in envisioning Algeria's women as passive and submissive bystanders in the struggle for its political future -and their own. French 5e Bureau psychological warfare leaflets and posters, notes Nacéra Aggoun, glorified women as the hope of the new, modern, peaceable Algeria. In the slogan of one hoarding, women would be 'the cornerstone in the construction of the new Algeria'. The key theme of the year 1959 was that of peace and the restoration of order: 'it is through us that peace will be reborn and peace is the traditional and sacred vocation of women'. The theme of women as modernizers was reflected in the campaign of the French to discourage Algerian women from wearing the veil (le dévoilement). Yet young French citizen-soldiers found what they saw and what they experienced was far removed from the nostalgic and romanticized preconceptions of Arab women with which they arrived in North Africa. Pontecorvo reminds us that Muslim women fought actively in the battle. Many passed secret documents and gathered intelligence. Some, such as Hassiba Ben Bouali, placed handbag bombs under bar stools. Far from remaining docile and passive, Algerian women assumed vital combat roles in prosecuting the struggle for national liberation. But there is much to be done to recover their memories of wartime experience and build these satisfactorily into an Algerian war historiography largely dominated, thus far, by masculine narratives. 95 French troops' morale in face of the widening Moslem participation in the FLN cause ebbed and flowed according to the professional or drafted quality of the soldiers and according to the phases of the conflict. In the early stages, even the legendary Foreign Legion suffered flagging morale. Eckard Michels discusses the lack of enthusiasm among aggressive legionnaires disillusioned by defeat and withdrawal from Indochina -a 'hot war' of the sort the Legion trained for -and from Morocco in 1956. Even this elite corps experienced a dangerously high level of desertions. No fewer than 604 legionnaires were posted as 'missing -deserted' at the end of 1957. This was equivalent to an entire battalion. In response, the legionnaires' training was lengthened to 20 weeks, morale and combat effectiveness recovering markedly from the turn of 1957-8. The revived spirits of the legionnaires resulted from the increasingly effective frontier barriers, the decline in ALN activity and improved rates of pay. By 1958 Salan, then the army commander-in-chief in Algeria, could state confidently that 'The Legion remained the very personification of high morale'. Legionnaires were appalled by the decisions in Paris to quit Algeria: the 1st REP (Foreign Legion Parachutist Regiment) backed the abortive generals' coup of April 1961 and was disbanded by de Gaulle as a punishment. As the war ended, the Legion had to uproot itself from its headquarters at Sidibel-Abbès and, in a very physical mark of French retreat, move to a new base at Orange in southern France. Legionnaires felt that their comrades had died in vain. 96 Paradoxically, therefore, the morale of professional troops strengthened the longer hostilities continued, while the morale of reservists and conscripts -though they came later to the war -tended progressively to weaken.
Part of the explanation lay in the peculiarly 'dirty', dishonourable kind of war it became. Bringing the war's brutalities home to a reading public in France were articles published from 1956-7 in Sartre's journal Les Temps Modernes and in semi-autobiographical narratives by reservists such as Mattéi and Daniel Zimmerman. 97 Their accounts make plain that neither side had a monopoly on cruelty and 'dirty tricks'. Mattéi, for example, confessed that men in his squad 'had a shack where systematically . . . nearly all enemy prisoners were tortured and interrogated'. He also recounts the occurrence of unauthorized summary executions. Yet he reminds us too of how horrifying were many encounters by young French civilians-in-uniform with the violence of the war. Ambushed by a wellconcealed ALN commando hidden in an olive grove that raked them with fire at 20 metres' range, Mattéi's squad lost five killed and three wounded. One of the latter was horrifically emasculated as a lesson to the colonial oppressors. Another soldier, this time a conscript private in the 14th Tirailleur Battalion from July 1958 to early 1961, Gerard Périot, frankly admitted that 'rank-and-file morale had never been very brilliant in Algeria'. The men were 'under-fed, disgusted by our frequent about-turns and errors, and appalled by the attitude of too many officers and NCO's more interested in medals and money than in pacifying Algeria'. 98 For metropolitan conscripts the tour of duty was extended to 28 months in 1959, a month more than the tour for those from the Algerian settler community. This caused rancour. So, too, did the fact that metropolitan conscripts were allowed only a single 23-day leave to visit their families during their service in Algeria. Périot confessed that 'the length of the tour terrified the men'. He also noted a widespread suspicion among his comrades-in-arms that the pied-noirs draftees were privileged with safer staff and garrison duties. 99 This corroded the unity of the army and helped undermine the commitment of the mainland French to the cause. These perceptions were transmitted home in letters to families and friends. They fuelled the sense that the risking of life and limb by reservists and draftees to preserve Algeria for the settlers went unappreciated.
With their war lost by 1962, a million settlers fled to France in a few months, most travelling with 'nothing. . . but a couple of cheap suitcases and bitter memories.' 100 However, in the current state of research the complexities of the pied-noirs' existence in Algeria is obscured by caricatures of them as small-town traders, petty functionaries and racist bigots. This crude portrait of the community needs to be redrawn. At one extreme the case of the pied-noir writer Jules Roy illuminates a more idealistic and heroic type. Resigning in the rank of colonel in 1953 in protest against French brutalities in Indochina, he spoke out in the late 1950s against the French and felt that Muslim Algerians 'were right to rebel against their oppressors'. 101 More ambiguous was the position of the even better known Nobel prize winner, Albert Camus. In truth, the settler community's diverse roles and culture awaits its historians. 102 In the longer term the awkwardness and suspicions felt by metropolitan conscripts and reservists towards the settler community they were in Algeria to protect placed a question mark over the whole French effort in North Africa. In terms of modest financial investment, faltering industrial development policy and the low-level of migration from France to Algeria, perceptive French commentators remarked on the eve of the outburst of violence that metropolitan efforts were not remotely commensurate with the challenges arising in North Africa. 103 After the FLN's insurrection was under way the Anglo-Saxon press and media, as Michael Brett's chapter points out, tended to echo the concerned French critiques about the conduct of the Algerian War. Journalists such as Edward Behr and Michael Kettle spent lengthy periods in Algeria covering both politics and the military operations for American and British news magazines and papers. 104 British commentators particularly latched onto ServanSchreiber's Lieutenant in Algeria (published in English translation in New York in 1957 and London in 1958), and Henri Alleg's searing indictment of torture, The Question, with its preface by Sartre, published in 1957. In the eyes of some of the French, Anglo-American writers and media commentators on the struggle legitimized the FLN's motives in seeking to internationalize the dimensions of the struggle. Paradoxically the FLN skilfully seized the moral high ground of universalism so often claimed by France. As they preached engagement in a revolution for the rights of Algerian men (and women) as citizens, the FLN benefited from AngloSaxon writers' help in drawing world-wide attention to the irony of France perpetrating appalling human rights' violations in Algeria.
International dimensions
In France's international relations after 1871 her statesmen sought in peace and war never again to face isolation. Possession of powerful friends and membership of alliances became a cornerstone of French geo-strategy. The crisis in Algeria at first seemed unlikely to deviate from this pattern. From November 1954 to the Suez debacle of November 1956 France, broadly speaking, succeeded in depicting the conflict as a general threat to her western allies. In Washington, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Republican administration was receptive to imagery of a 'Red Tide' of global communism sweeping west from the Middle East around the Mediterranean shoreline. Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister , was even more convinced of the existence of an AraboCommunist conspiracy. This was orchestrated, he thought, by the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser. For the obsessive Eden (who had been Foreign Secretary during Hitler's diplomatic 'march of conquest ' in 1936-8) Nasser and Arab nationalism amounted to a 'new Nazism'. Such attitudes in Washington and London fed an illusory French expectation that the war they were waging in Algeria would enjoy major Allied assistance. 105 French leaders did have early success when they appealed to the NATO obligation to defend the territorial sovereignty of one and all. Suez, however, shattered French hopes.
After 1956 the Eisenhower administration stepped back from an Algerian imbroglio that Americans now construed as 'imperialist'. Eden's successor, the more canny and pragmatic Harold Macmillan (1957-63) , tacked in the wake of this American change of course. British policy cooled markedly towards French military resistance to nationalism in Africa, Macmillan himself famously speaking in 1960, at Cape Town, of a 'wind of change' blowing through the continent. 106 In February 1958 the French air force in Algeria mounted an unauthorized bombing of an unprotected refugee camp at Sakhiet, in Tunisia, after a story that the camp was sheltering an ALN commando unit. Not only was Sakhiet an outrage against international law, it unleashed a storm of condemnation from the world's media. This worsened France's relations with her allies and put her in the dock of the United Nations. 107 John F. Kennedy, on the campaign stump for the 1960 presidential elections, joined the chorus of criticism. After his January 1961 inauguration, condemnation of French actions in Algeria became official US policy. Hence, French image management through propaganda was defeated by France's own clumsy blunders and by the internationalization and 'mediatization' of the war. French policy-makers hoped to preserve hermetic partitions between overseas territories and handle each case of nationalism individually. But the spread of radio, newsreel and television coverage of wars and insurrections placed policymakers in an unaccustomed glare of publicity, compressed their decision-making time and strengthened French sentiments that an end to the Algerian imbroglio could only come through withdrawal.
Paradoxically, the FLN thus imitated de Gaulle's own tactics for the wartime Resistance, whereby primacy was given to international and political campaigns over purely military action. After the Soummam Declaration, the FLN manipulated the world's media far more effectively than did their French opponents. Why then did this international opprobrium not induce France to retreat from its Algerian entanglement immediately? Three explanations suggest themselves. First, and paradoxically, France's international standing over the Algerian War plunged to its nadir just as the French armed forces were achieving military victory. This made influential generals determined to fight on: after all, the aim of military action had ostensibly been to create security conditions conducive to politico-electoral-economic reforms to keep France in Algeria. 108 Second, the weight of the settler community and its political allies in Paris kept a brake on metropolitan inclinations to cut and run. Third, as Jacques Frémeaux's chapter discusses, it was not just the coastal zone and the pied-noirs at stake. There were also the far-reaching strategic and economic assets in the Sahara: the missile and nuclear weapons facilities at Colomb-Béchar, Reggane, Hammaguir; the oil wells of, for example, Edjelé and Hassi Messaoud. 109 During this time the Algerians played a deft diplomatic game, skilfully exploiting French mistakes. As the underdogs, FLN diplomats learnt from an early stage to make the most of the international card. The November 1954 Declaration of the FLN, issued in the aftermath of the All Saints' Day attacks, enlisted 'the diplomatic support of our Arab and Moslem brothers'. Subsequently, the internationalization of the struggle became a core FLN tactic. This often capitalized on French blunders and turned them into nationalist triumphs. In this way the FLN gained support abroad. It did so, firstly, by securing safe havens, training camps and propaganda outlets (Radio Cairo); secondly by winning diplomatic recognition for the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA), the nationalist provisional government, from a steadily-expanding list of eastern bloc and Third World nations from 1958 onwards. The French found, as a result, that they were swimming against a strengthening tide of international opprobrium. 110 
Testimonies
A deeper and more sophisticated understanding of the war depends upon recording and integrating personal narratives. Written documents are never the whole historical record; how much more is this so when we are dealing with clandestine organizations in which to write anything down could be a short step to arrest, torture and death. Now almost a half century after the conflict there is an urgency in assembling these unwritten memories of the participants. This volume makes a contribution. One of its most exciting and original dimensions is its achievement in bringing together disputed, sometimes confrontational, Franco-French narratives. But we recognize that this is a small and unscientific selection that can only hint at the rich seam of testimony. Still seriously under-represented are records of the views and experiences of women in Algeria from 1954 to 1962, Muslims as well as pied-noirs, along with the perspectives of mothers, wives, girlfriends, children of Frenchmen who served, and some of whom died, in Algeria. Part III of this collection presents perspectives from career army officers on the one hand, and from anti-war activists, both civiliansin-uniform and militant, politically engaged intellectuals. The testimonies are those of the late Major Paul Léger, Colonel Henri Coustaux and General Alain Bizard from the French officer corps of the Algerian war era, together with those of André Mandouze, François Sirkidji, Bernard Sigg, and the late Georges Mattéi from the broad-based French opposition to the war.
Conclusions -avenues for future research
Further research would illuminate relations between the home front and war front. In the former case too little has yet been done to elucidate public opinion and correlate attitudes to the ebbs and flows of the war. 111 Work is needed comparable to that of Stéphane Audouin-Rouzeau on front-line troops' daily preoccupations in the First World War. This has begun through the collection and publication of letters from drafted servicemen, giving a voice to an otherwise silent working class. 112 These men were not natural correspondents but, perhaps for the only sustained time in their lives, found that distance from home prompted them to pick up a pen. For these 20-year-olds, resentful that destiny had saddled them with the Algerian War, 'no-one could tell them this was the best time of their lives'. 113 The next stage in the recovery of memory produced surveys and interviews among veterans. This has pulled back the shroud that hid their experiences. As the 'Djebel generation' nears old age, mourning for dead comrades and their own lost youth complete, history and historians are at last helping them to some form of closure and to 'reintegrate History'. 114 A key area for further research is the roles and attitudes of French and Algerian women to the war. Long-service professionals may have had wives and mothers imbued with a 'colonialist', maternalistic mentality. Older reservists typically were married men, some with families; younger conscripts often had girlfriends and fiancées in France. In short, this war impacted extensively on the women of the metropole. Finding their diaries, or letters exchanged between them to confide views on the war's progress and its politics, promises to reveal the outlooks of the 'second sex', the hitherto 'silent half' of the French population.
In conclusion, study of the Algerian conflict now draws at least as much from filmic and literary representations, from oral traditions and testimonies, as it does from the release of official papers -welcome though the latter is after the long 'silence'. 115 The essays here interweave multiple sources and diverse perspectives. They point to the varieties of experience and the legitimacy of the many memories of the war, even if these remain divergent and irreconcilable. The triumphalist narrative of a united Algerian people throwing off French colonialist shackles held sway in the 1960s and 1970s; but this served history no better than the 'Nostalgérie Française' that emanated from certain quarters of France at the sight of Algeria's descent into anarchy and bloodletting in the 1990s. It may still surprise that the Algerian War lasted as long as America's Vietnam War and that as many French troops served in Algeria as did Americans in Vietnam. It may also surprise that, by comparison, 25 per cent more French families were hit by the death of a serviceman in Algeria than American families who suffered a loss in Vietnam. However, the Americans openly confronted their Vietnam traumas, President Ronald Reagan dedicating the Memorial Wall in Washington in 1982 only seven years after the 'fall' of Saigon. By contrast, forty years after the 'fall' of French Algeria, French governments had offered no such cathartic gesture to the French people. Given the significance of the war for French society, coming to terms with such a scar in its past has become an international scholarly enterprise. 116 The contributions in the present volume have sought to avoid both colonial rehabilitation and the mythmaking of Algerian nationalism. The 'new history' of the Algerian War, multi-dimensional and open to previously silent voices, promises much. By working together for this project, rather than on separate tracks, historians of culture, the military, diplomacy and society suggest how a more rounded understanding of one of the most important but neglected wars of the twentieth century can emerge.
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